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THE MISSOURI HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
IN THE YEARS 1958-1960*
WILLIAM H. BECKER** and TERENCE C. PORTER***
The major questions concerning application of the Missouri humanitar-
ian doctrine remained unanswered as of the close of the year 1960. How-
ever, there were major developments in this fluid field of the law.
Among the unanswered questions is the crucial one: May two negli-
gently inattentive (oblivious) motor vehicle operators who drive their
vehicles into collision, each of whom had equal opportunity to avoid the
collision, and each of whom suffers personal injuries, recover damages
simultaneously?" Under the common law last clear chance doctrine, neither
could recover on a single assumed version of the facts. Under the formula
*This review covers selected cases reported in the years 1958, 1959, and 1960,
including the advance sheet 340 S.W.2d No. 1 dated December 27, 1960.
**Attorney, Columbia, Missouri; LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.
***Attorney, Columbia, Missouri; LL.B., University of Missouri, 1958. Mr.
Porter prepared Part IV, Summary of Notable Cases.
1. For detailed discussion see Becker, The Missouri Humanitarian Doctrine-
1956, 1957, 23 Mo. L. REv. 420 (1958). For convenience note 1 of that article is
repeated:
Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 1:
Discovered Helpless Peril
The peril to plaintiff's person, property, or both results from physical help-
lessness caused -by plaintiff's lack of care. Defendant actually discovers the peril in
time, thereafter, with safety to himself, to avoid damage to plaintiff -by the exer-
cise of care. This is a simple last clear chance case. The plaintiff may recover for
personal injury and property damage despite his negligence in practically all com-
mon law jurisdictions. This result is well settled in Missouri and not expected to
be challenged; but this is not a humanitarian negligence case.
Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 2:
Discoverable Helpless Peril
The facts are the same as in Case 1 except that the defendant does not actually
discover the peril, but in the exercise of care he should have discovered it in time
to avoid damage, by the exercise of care and with safety to himself. As in Case 1,
a majority of courts permit plaintiff to recover for personal. injury or property
damage under the last clear chance rule. This is not a humanitarian negligence case,
and the rule is not expected to 'be challenged.
Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 3:
Discovered Oblivious Peril
The peril to plaintiff's person, property or both, results from plaintiff's negli-
gent inattentiveness (obliviousness in Missouri judicial parlance). Defendant (as in
Case 1) actually discovers the peril in time, thereafter, to avoid damage to plaintiff
by the exercise of care. This is a last clear chance case. It is not a humanitarian
case. The rule that plaintiff may recover seems settled in Missouri and elsewhere.
(26)
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of the Missouri humanitarian rule, each can make a submissible case against
the other.2
Another unanswered question is this: May a claimant recover for
property damages under the true humanitarian situation where its peril or
his peril was a result of negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness)? This
question was propounded in the opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals
in Glenn u. Offua,3 but it remains unanswered in 1960.
Since the humanitarian doctrine is "judge made law," litigants have
repeatedly sought a solution to the unanswered questions from the Supreme
Court, without success so far. Attempts to secure change or clarification of
the doctrine from the legislature have also failed. The attitude of the legis-
There appears to be no serious challenge to the soundness of the right of plaintiff to
recover in this case.
Under the general designation "humanitarian doctrine," the Missouri courts
have recognized all three common law last clear chance cases and have added a
fourth type of case wherein the injured party may recover despite his contributory
negligence. This fourth type of case, which is the unique humanitarian case is as
follows:
True Humanitarian Case No. 4:
Discoverable Oblivious Peril
The injured person is in a position of imminent peril as a result of his negligent
inattentiveness (obliviousness). The injured party could extricate himself from his
peril by his own efforts, if he were aware of his peril and used care. The defendant
or party against whom claim for damages is made does not actually discover the
peril of the injured party. Nevertheless, in the exercise of care the party causing
injury should have discovered the peril in time thereafter with safety to himself
by the use of care to have avoided injury to the plaintiff. In other words the party
causing injury is also negligently inattentive (oblivious). The Missouri courts per-
mit recovery by the injured party in this case; and in this respect are more liberal
in permitting recovery than courts of other jurisdictions.
2. Seldom do the Missouri courts distinguish between common law last
clear chance cases and humanitarian cases. The phrase "humanitarian rule" is
used usually to embrace all four situations noted above. The "constitutive facts"
of the humanitarian doctrine are set out in the leading case of Banks v. Morris &
Co., 302 Mo. 254, 257 S.W. 482, 484 (1924) (en banc), as follows:
The constitutive facts of a cause of action under the humanitarian
rule, stated in their simplest terms, without any of the refinements, limi-
tations, or exceptions which might arise on a particular state of facts, are
contained in this formula:
'(1) Plaintiff was in a position of peril; (2) defendant had notice
thereof (if it was the duty of defendant to have been on the lookout, con-
structive notice suffices); (3) defendant after receiving such notice had the
present ability, with the means at hand, to have averted the impending
injury without injury to himself or others; (4) he failed to exercise ordi-
nary care to avert such impending injury; and (5) by reason thereof
plaintiff was injured.'
Add to this the rule that the position of peril may result from claimant's inatten-
tiveness or obliviousness of danger as well as from physical helplessness and the
formula is complete. See Perkins v. Terminal R. Ass'n, 340 Mo. 868, 102 S.W.2d
915 (1937) (en banc), on obliviousness as a cause of peril.
3. 309 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Spr. Ct. App. 1958).
1961]
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lature so far seems to be that the doctrine is the creation of the judiciary
and should be controlled by the judiciary.
I. GuEST v. HoST CASE
Nevertheless, the signs of the court's dissatisfaction with the rule and
the struggle to limit its application continue to be visible in the current
opinions. For instance, in the last decision of 1960, the latent question of
applicability of the doctrine in a guest-passenger driver-host relationship
(long assumed) reached issue in the en banc decision in Price v. Nickolson.'
By a narrow majority of one vote, 4-3, the doctrine was held applicable
where there is a guest-host relationship. The principal opinion of Special
Judge Hunter pointed out that the formula of Banks v. Morris & Co.5
could by its terms apply in the guest-host case. The minority relied upon
two concepts which had been growing in the movement to limit rather than
revoke the humanitarian rule. The first concept was that of necessity. It
holds that the "niceties" of imminent peril need not be inflicted upon a
jury, court, or counsel "needlessly" in words of Judge Storckman's dissent
in Price v. Nicolson.6 In the words of Chief Justice Hyde's dissent: "In
this case, a humanitarian negligence submission was completely unneces-
sary .... I This idea that the doctrine does not apply where unnecessary to
support a submission of the case has never been expressly recognized,
though it seems to have been a silent consideration in the holding that
certain cases were submissible on wilful and wanton negligence rather than
on humanitarian negligence as in McClanahan v. St. Louis Pub. Seru. Co.,
The other concept which has underlain limitations on the doctrine was
featured by the minority. This concept is that the doctrine does not apply
where the peril is created by the defendant's own act rather than the act
of plaintiff or a third person. This may be another way of stating the rule of
necessity, for if plaintiff did not cause his own peril and defendant or a
third person did cause it, it is difficult if not impossible to invoke contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
In any event, by a narrow margin the concept of necessity and the
related concept of peril caused solely by defendant were overruled in this
latest guest-passenger driver-host case. It is anyone's guess whether the rul-
ing in Price v. Nickolson has laid these concepts to rest. It is doubtful. In
4. 340 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1960) (en banc).
5. Supra note 2.
6. 340 S.W.2d at 12.
7. Id. at 14, 15.
8. 242 S.W.2d 265 (St. L. Ct. App. 1951).
[Vol. 26
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day to day application the dissatisfaction with the rule, of which this narrow
conflict is but a symptom, will persist. It will persist mainly because the rule
contains a built-in dilemma, the question of simultaneous recoveries by
equally oblivious, equally negligent personal injury claimants.
II. THE SOLE CAUSE INSTRUcTION
When the basic rationale of the doctrine is either not settled, or is
variously interpreted by the judges, division of opinion on matters of practice
including instructions is bound to occur frequently. One of the most
fertile fields of controversy and reversal is the giving of the sole cause in-
struction in humanitarian cases.
In Janssens v. Thompson,9 the court en banc by a 4-3 decision refused
to condemn the instruction outright. But the giving of the sole cause in-
struction continued to be a source of difficulty.
A. Plaintiff's Acts as Sole Cause
For example, attention is invited to Sheerin v. St. Louis Pub. Serv.
Co., 10 which warned the bar that use of the words "negligence" or "negli-
gently," or reference to plaintiff's duty to use care, to characterize the acts
of plaintiff constituting "sole cause" were in all probability reversibly er-
roneous. This case was followed in 1959 in Landau v. St. Louis Pub. Serv.
Co."
B. Acts of Third Party as Sole Cause
Despite the Sheerin case, the court later said in Rosenfeld v. Peters=2
that an instruction containing the words "negligence" referring to a third
party's negligence as the sole cause was permissible. In this case Chief
Justice Hyde undertook to distinguish between a simple converse instruction
and a sole cause instruction, saying:
It is sometimes overlooked 'that any defendant's instruction
based on the theory that a plaintiff's injuries were caused solely
by his own negligence actually submits a converse situation from
the plaintiff's humanitarian submission;' and this is likewise true
as to the sole negligence of a third party."5 In the Happy case,14
9. 228 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1950) (en banc).
10. 300 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1957).
11. 322 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1959).
12. 327 S.W.2d 264, 267-268 (Mo. 1959).
13. Citing Janssens v. Thompson, supra note 9, at 750; Happy v. Blanton,
303 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Mo. 1957).
14. Happy v. Blanton, supra note 13.
1961]
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we held the sole cause instruction therein failed to hypothesize
fact [sic] showing a sole cause situation saying: '[A]n instruction
submitting the issue of nonliability on the part of a defendant
because the negligence of a third party was the sole proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries must do more than direct a verdict for
that defendant only upon a finding that the third party was in
some manner negligent.' As to a sole cause instruction, we further
pointed out therein: 'This latter form of an instruction, as con-
trasted to a converse instruction, concedes that the injuries to
plaintiff resulted from the negligence of someone, and it authorizes
a finding by the jury for the defendant only if it finds that the
negligence of the plaintiff, or someone other than the defendant,
was the sole proximate cause of the injuries, and also that defendant
was not negligent, or if he was negligent that his negligence was not
concurring negligence. Therefore, if the defendant undertakes to
absolve himself from liability to plaintiff on the basis of sole cause
negligence, he thereby assumes the burden of hypothesizing a state-
ment of facts, supported, by the evidence, from which a jury could
find that not only did his negligence not contribute, in causing
plaintiff's injuries, but in addition thereto that the sole proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's injuries was the negligence of someone
other than him, and the hypothesization of facts in the instruction,
or by proper reference to other instructions, must be complete in
both respects.' (As to true converse instructions that do not re-
quire hypothesization of facts see also Liebow v. Jones Store Co. 15
and Schaefer v. Accardi.) 16
The Rosenfeld case was followed in Villines v. Vaughn.-
It is apparent that the doctrine of the Sreerin case restricting the
language of a sole cause instruction based on plaintiff's, act may be equally
applicable to a sole cause instruction based on a third party's acts, since
antecedent negligence of a third party is no more a defense in a humanitarian
case than antecedent (contributory primary negligence) of the plaintiff. If it
is misleading to refer to negligence and the duty to use care in respect of
plaintiff's conduct submitted as the sole cause, is it not equally misleading
to instruct on the -duty to use care and negligence of a third party (plaintiff's
host-driver for example)? At least such a holding is a possibility. The form
of instruction in this field is by no means finally settled. If one has a good
15. 303 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Mo. 1957).
16. 315 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Md. 1958).
17. 330 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1959).
[Vol. 26
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defense the wise thing to do is to play safe in requesting the court to in-
struct the jury.
Carney v. Stuartes contains a good summary of the recent cases,
pointing out certain errors and dangerous areas in a sole cause submission.
III. CROss-CLAMs BETWEEN DEFENDANTS
Under the practice of permitting cross-claims between defendants, we
encounter another novel problem. This is illustrated in the case of Page v.
Hamilton.-9
In the Page casei plaintiff sued her host-driver and the driver of an on-
coming vehicle involved in a headon collision. The peril occurred when
plaintiff's host-driver pulled into his left lane to pass a line of vehicles travel-
ing in the same direction. The vehicle in which plaintiff was riding collided
with a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction on its right hand side.
Plaintiff submitted her case against both drivers on the humanitarian
doctrine in failing to slacken and swerve. The driver of the oncoming vehicle
cross-claimed against the host-driver on primary negligence. The host-driver
submitted contributory negligence as a defense to the cross-claim.
The jury found for plaintiff against both defendants, thereby finding
each guilty of humanitarian negligence contributing to the collision. But the
jury also found on the cross-claim that the oncoming driver was not guilty
of contributory negligence and was entitled to damages. On' complaint that
the verdict on the cross-claim was inconsistent with the verdict for plaintiff,
the Supreme Court held that the verdicts should be affirmed, overruling
McGuire v. Southwestern, Greyhound Lines, Inc. 20 The reasoning was that
the same result could be reached in separate trials, therefore there is no
reason to forbid it in one trial.
IV. SuVI1iARY OF NOTABLE CASES
Closser v. Becker21 arose from a pedestrian and truck collision on a
street in Kansas City. The plaintiff was struck by the right side of an east-
bound milk truck as he stood on the traffic side of his parked vehicle
oblivious to the approach of the milk truck. The case was submitted on
humanitarian negligence in failing to swerve. Upon appeal the court held
18. 331 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1960).
19. 329 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1959).
20. 291 S.W.2d 621 (St. L. Ct. App. 1956).
21. 308 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1958).
19611
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that a submissible case had been made. The principal argument involved the
question of when the plaintiff came into a position of peril. The court said
it could be found that plaintiff's peril arose when the truck driven by the
defendant was 75 to 100 feet from the plaintiff, who was clearly oblivious at
all times. It was not necessary that this case be submitted on" humanitarian
negligence.
Penrington v. Carper22 arose from the collision of a pickup truck with
a passenger car at the intersection of The Paseo and Eighth Street in
Kansas City. The Paseo consists of north and south lanes of traffic separated
by a parkway. The collision occurred as the plaintiff's vehicle, west bound
on Eighth Street, reached a point about midway of the northbound lanes.
The refusal of the trial court to submit the plaintiff's case on a human-
itarian instruction charging in the conjunctive failure to swerve and slacken
and to stop was upheld. The court said that the evidence did not suf-
ficiently demonstrate that the defendant had the ability to take action to
avoid the collision. The court commented that the plaintiff had not presented
evidence of the ability of the defendant to stop or slacken speed and said that
those facts could not be judicially noticed. The court also held that the
plaintiff's verdict directing instruction was defective because it omitted
"with safety to others," and here there was evidence of another vehicle along-
side and to the left of defendant's vehicle at the time of the collision.
Downing v. Dixon2' arose out of a collision of two passenger cars at a
"T" intersection. The plaintiff was a guest in the vehicle driven by the
defendant Dixon which had stopped at a stop sign on a side road, and then
proceeded onto the highway into the path of an oncoming auto driven by
the defendant Hullet. Both drivers were sued. The defendant Hullet cross-
claimed against plaintiff's host who in turn counterclaimed against Hullet.
There was a verdict in favor of Hullet on plaintiff's claim and on his cross-
claim against Dixon based on primary negligence. No verdict was returned
on Dixon's claim against Hullet. The plaintiff submitted his case against his
host on an instruction of humanitarian negligence in failing to stop, and
receved a verdict in his favor. Upon appeal this was reversed and remanded
because his instruction contained a paragraph: ". . . persons traveling on
Highways must exercise highest degree of care." This was held to have in-
jected antecedent negligence into the case.
22. 309 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1958).
23. 313 S.W.2d 644 Mo. 1958).
[Vol. 26
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In addition to remanding the plaintiff's claim against his host, the court
also remanded Hullet's cross-claim against Dixon (as opposed to reversing
the verdict outright for contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing
to maintain a lookout) and Dixon's counterclaim against Hullet (the latter
for the reason that the jury had erroneously failed to return a verdict
thereon).
Kelley v. Terminal R. Ass' i 4 arose from a collision between an auto-
mobile in which plaintiff was a passenger and a freight train at a street
intersection in St. Louis. The plaintiff's case was submitted on primary
negligence in failing to sound warning and to provide a headlight on the
engine and on humanitarian negligence in failing to stop. The defendant
received a verdict in the trial court and the plaintiff contended on appeal
that defendant's sole cause instruction was erroneously given. The court did
not review the sole cause instruction but stated "there being no substantial
evidence whereon to base the submission of the defendant's ability to stop,
it must be held that for such want or omission the plaintiff failed to make a
case on that issue." 25
The plaintiff did not offer expert testimony of ability to stop the train,
but instead relied on defendant's engineer, who testified that the train could
have been stopped in 10 to 12 feet, including reaction time, at a speed of 15
to 25 miles per hour. The court said that this was not substantial evidence
upon which a submission of the case could be justified because this evidence
was incredible, impossible and contrary to scientific principles established by
the law of physics.26
Shirley v. Norfleet27 arose from a no-contact situation which occurred
when the driver of the plaintiff's vehicle attempted to pass the defendant's
passenger car on a straight stretch of highway. Just as the plaintiff's driver
started to pass, the defendant pulled out to pass a car in front of him. The
vehicle in which plaintiff was riding went off the road to the left and plain-
tiff was injured. The case was tried before the court and judgment for de-
fendant was entered. Upon appeal the judgment of the trial court was af-
firmed. No issues of submissibility or improper instructions were involved and
the court reviewed the evidence to determine if an improper conclusion had
24. 315 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1958).
25. Id. at 703.
26. At 25 miles per hour the train would travel in excess of 10 to 12 feet in
reaction time alone, not taking into consideration the time necessary for effective
application of the brakes of a train.
27. 315 S.W.2d 715 (Mo. 1958).
1961]
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been reached by the lower court since no findings had been requested. On
the issue of primary negligence the court held that since the vehicle in
which the plaintiff was riding was operated by her son, she was barred by
his negligence, he being her agent. On humanitarian negligence the court
said that plaintiff couldn't recover because her peril did not arise until,
when plaintiff's driver was within 10 feet of defendant's car, defendant pulled
out to pass, and it was not apparent that thereafter the defendant could
have taken action to avoid the mishap.
Davis v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. 28 arose when the plaintiff, a pedestrian,
was struck by the defendant's bus which crossed an intersection on a green
light after having stopped to pick up passengers. The case was submitted on
humanitarian negligence in failing to stop, and there was a jury verdict for
defendant, after which the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a new
trial. Upon appeal the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had failed to
make a submissible case. The plaintiff's evidence failed to establish the
location of the defendant's bus when she came into a position of imminent
peril and therefore did not establish that the driver could thereafter have
taken action to avoid striking the plaintiff.
Millar v. Berg29 involved another vehicle-pedestrian collision, which
occurred as the plaintiff was attempting to cross Vandeventer Boulevard in
St. Louis. The defendant was making a left turn south onto Vandeventer
from Laclede. The plaintiff submitted his case on humanitarian negligence
in failing to stop or swerve, and there was a jury verdict in his favor. The
plaintiff's evidence established he was 35 feet from the curb when struck and
that the average walking speed of a man is two to three miles per hour;
therefore the court found that the plaintiff was in -a position of peril for at
least seven seconds within which time the defendant could have taken action
to avoid striking the plaintiff. The court, in holding that a submissible
case had been made, commented that the plaintiff could have the benefit
of the defendant's more favorable estimate of speed since his own estimate
was based on a split second observation just prior to being struck.
In Fenneren v. Smitk3° the plaintiff's passenger car collided with the
defendant's approaching dump truck just off the end of a one-lane bridge
on a gravel road. The plaintiff offered to submit her case on both primary
negligence and humanitarian negligence in failing to stop but the trial 'court
28. 316 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1958).
29. 316 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. 1958).
30. 316 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1958).
[Vol. 26
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granted defendant's motion for directed 'verdict and subsequently granted
plaintiff's motion for new trial. On appeal the court held that the plaintiff had
not made a case of submissible humanitarian negligence, but remanded the
case for a new trial. The court said the plaintiff did not make a submissible
case for the reason that she could not have the benefit of the defendant's
estimates of speed. The court said that a plaintiff can, in some situations,
have the benefit of a defendant's estimates of speed, but that she could not
in establishing humanitarian negligence in this instance because such esti-
mates were contrary to her theory of primary negligence, which hypothe-
sized excessive speed.
Noted v. St. Loids Pub. Serv. Co.31 arose from a right angle intersection
collision between the plaintiff's passenger car and the defendant's streetcar.
The plaintiff submitted his case on primary negligence for violation of a
30 miles-per-hour speed limit and on humanitarian negligence in failing to
slacken speed. A jury verdict was returned for the plaintiff. On appeal the
court held that the plaintiff made a submissible case on primary and hu-
manitarian negligence.
On the question of humanitarian negligence the Supreme Court dis-
cussed two problems. The first involved the place where the plaintiff came
into the zone of imminent peril. The plaintiff's testimony was that he had
observed the defendant's streetcar 170 feet away and had thereafter
attempted to cross the tracks. The court said that although the plain-
tiff was not oblivious to the "approach" of the defendant's streetcar he
was oblivious to the "danger" it presented. This being the case, the jury
could find that at some point between the curb of the street and the point
where the plaintiff could last stop short of the overhang of the streetcar, he
entered a zone of peril.
The other problem discussed arose because the plaintiff had not
produced testimony of ability to slacken the speed of the streetcar. In-
stead the plaintiff introduced evidence of the actual stopping of the street-
car after collision which was 31 to 86 feet. The court took judicial notice of
the fact that the overhang of a streetcar was "approximately two feet" and
"assumed" that the plaintiff's car did not exceed twenty feet in length.
Using these facts and the plaintiff's "average" speed of three miles per hour
and the defendant's speed of 45 miles per hour, as testified to by the plain-
tiff's witnesses, the court was able to calculate that defendant's streetcar
31. 319 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1958).
1961]
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was far enough back up the track to give the operator the ability to have
slackened the speed enough to avoid hitting plaintiff.
The humanitarian submission of this case seems to have been upheld
principally upon the assumption that the ability to slacken the speed of a
etreetcar is in some way related to its ability to come to a stop while
dragging an automobile in front of it. This may not always prove to be a
reliable guidepost for submitting a "slackening speed" case and the
production of expert testimony would seem to be better recommended.
Allen v. Haye,02 was a wrongful death action to recover for the death
of the deceased who was struck by a passenger car while sitting intoxicated
in the westbound lane of a highway at night. The testimony indicated that
just prior to striking the deceased the defendant was traveling 60 miles per
hour and had just met a string of cars. The shoulders of the highway were
muddy. The plaintiff's case was submitted on humanitarian negligence in
failing to stop. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed outright a judgment
of the lower court in favor of the plaintiff, entered pursuant to a jury
verdict. The court said that the plaintiff's evidence was not sufficiently sub-
stantial to warrant a submission of the case to the jury.
The plaintiff attempted to make a submissible case on ability to stop
on the testimony of an expert witness who had performed a series of experi-
ments and on the testimony of a lay witness who had previously seen the
deceased sitting in the road. The expert testified that he had made a num-
ber of stopping-distance tests using a bag of straw in the highway, and
further testified as to distances when it became visible and his ability there-
after to stop a car similar to the defendant's short of the bag. His testimony
was apparently destroyed as substantial evidence by his admission that on-
coming headlights would necessarily alter the distance within which he
could see the bag of straw. The testimony of the lay witness who satd he saw
the deceased when 60 to 80 feet away was also held inconclusive as to the
ability of the defendant, who was hindered by oncoming headlights, to see
the deceased. The court said that the jury should not be permitted to
speculate on when the defendant should have seen the deceased sitting in
the road.
Tohson v. Presley's arose out of a headon collision at night between a
passenger car being operated by the plaintiff and defendant's tractor-trailer
32. 320 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1959).
33. 320 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1959).
[Vol. 26
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truck on Highway 166. The plaintiff's evidence indicated that as he slowed
to let a car in front of him make a left turn, the car that he was towing
caused the car he was operating to be jackknifed out into the path of de-
fendant's oncoming truck. The plaintiff's case was submitted on human-
itarian negligence in failing to stop. A jury verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed and remanded because the plaintiff's verdict directing
instruction failed to apply the standard of "highest degree of care" to the
statement in the instruction that the defendant "by keeping a lookout...
could have or should have known that the plaintiff" was in a position of
peril. The court felt that if the standard is not mentioned there is, in ef-
fect, an absolute duty to maintain a lookout imposed upon the defendant.
An interesting sidelight of this case was the argument advanced by the
appellant that plaintiff's expert testimony on the ability of the defendant to
stop was insufficient to make a submissible case on that issue since it was in
conflict with plaintiff's evidence of the defendant's actual skidmarks. The
issue was not determinative in this case, but it is conceivable that under some
circumstances it could lead to difficulty.
Williams v. Miller"' arose from injuries received by plaintiff who was
crossing a street when struck by defendant's truck. The plaintiff had walked
into the street from in front of a parked bus which defendant was attempt-
ing to pass. Plaintiff's case was submitted on humanitarian negligence. A
verdict and judgment for defendant was reversed on appeal because one of
defendant's instructions injected plaintiff's antecedent negligence into the
case because it directed the jury's attention to the conduct of the plaintiff
before and leading up to the position of imminent peril. The objectionable
part of the instruction read: ".... if you find and believe from the evidence
that in getting into such a position of imminent peril that he [plaintiff] ran
across in front of the standing bus, into the path of the truck ... when the
truck was so close that the defendant could not .. . avoid striking the
plaintiff . .. ."
Landau v. St. Louis Pub. Seru. Co. 5 arose from a collision between a
passenger car operated by the plaintiff's wife and a streetcar owned by the
defendant. The collision occurred when the plaintiff's wife, who was traveling
in a lane of traffic to the right of and adjacent to the streetcar tracks, drove
her car to the left and ahead of the streetcar in an attempt to pass a truck
which was double parked. Plaintiff's suit was for medical expenses and loss of
34. 321 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1959).
35. Supra note 11.
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services and society of his wife, and his case was submitted on human-
itarian negligence in failing to slacken speed. The trial resulted in a judg-
ment for the defendant. On appeal this was reversed because of the giving
of defendant's erroneous sole cause instruction which contained an abstract
statement of law to the effect that the plaintiff's wife was bound to exercise
the highest degree of care for her own safety at the time -and place. 6 The
court said that this error was not cured by the so-called "tail" on plaintiff's
verdict directing instruction which read: "and this is true even though you
find and believe from the evidence that Mrs. Landau was guilty of negli-
gence in getting into the aforesaid position of peril .... .
Hickerson v. Portner,7 arose from a daylight, right angle, intersection
collision between a passenger car in which plaintiff was riding and an auto-
mobile driven by the defendant. The case was submitted on both primary
negligence and humanitarian negligence in failing to swerve. In the
lower court defendant received a jury verdict. On appeal this was overturned
and the case remanded. The plaintiff's contention that the defendant's
sole cause instruction erroneously injected antecedent negligence into the
case was sustained. The instruction contained an abstract statement of law
that "it is the duty of the driver of every vehicle entering a through highway
to exercise the highest degree of care to yield the right-of-way to other
vehicles which are approaching so close on the through highway as to
constitute an immediate hazard . .. .
Yarrington v. Lininger3" arose from a collision involving a -very interest-
ing fact situation. The plaintiff was driving a vehicle south on Highway 136
and was being followed by defendant Lininger. Both vehicles were approach-
ing a vehicle coming from the opposite direction driven by defendant
Bucholz. When the plaintiff's vehicle and the Bucholz vehicle were about
600 feet apart Lininger started to pass the plaintiff. The vehicles of the
plaintiff and Lininger traveled side by side until an instant before the col-
lision when Lininger started to pull the front of his vehicle to the right, to
go around the plaintiff, but had as yet not pulled into the plaintiff's path.
While moving to the right the vehicle driven by Lininger was hit on the left
rear by the Bucholz vehicle knocking it into the front of plaintiff's vehicle
causing her to veer to the right into the ditch. The plaintiff submitted her
case on primary negligence against Lininger and on humanitarian negligence
36. Following the case of Sheerin v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 10.
37. 325 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. 1959).
38. 327 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1959).
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against Bucholz. A jury verdict was returned in plaintiff's favor and only
Bucholz appealed. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not make a
submissible case of humanitarian negligence against Bucholz for the reason
that at no time prior to the time the Bucholz car struck the Lininger vehicle
was the plaintiff in a position of imminent peril, since at no time prior to
that was there any vehicle in her path, and further there was no evidence that
Bucholz could have taken any action to avoid 'plaintiff's injuries after the
collision between the Lininger and Bucholz vehicles.
It is interesting to note that the misadventure of the plaintiff in sub-
mitting her case against Bucholz on humanitarian negligence was not fatal
as the court remanded the case and pointed out there would be no reason
why her case against Bucholz could not be made and submitted on primary
negligence.
Ornder v. Childers9 arose from a collision when plaintiff attempted to
make a left turn in front of defendant who was following plaintiff's vehicle.
The plaintiff submitted his case on humanitarian negligence in failing 'to
swerve. Judgment pursuant to jury verdict was entered for the plaintiff.
On appeal this was reversed and the case remanded for the reason that the
plaintiff's verdict directing instruction did not sufficiently hypothesize where
the plaintiff came into peril. The instruction hypothesized that the plaintiff
came into imminent peril as he "apporached" the intersection where he in-
tended to make a left turn. This was insufficient since he was not actually
in peril until he started to move to his left into the lane in which 'defendant
was attempting to pass.
ScIimittzeke v. City of Cape Girardeat4 ° involved a right angle inter-
section collision on wet streets. Plaintiff's automobile was almost through the
intersection when struck in the right rear by defendant's truck. The Supreme
Court held that the case was submissible both on primary negligence and hu-
manitarian negligence. There are two items of interest in the case. The
first was that there was no expert testimony of the ability to slacken the
speed of defendant's vehicle. The court supplied this deficiency by com-
puting the defendant's location when -the plaintiff went into a zone of peril.
The court said: "It must be recognized that in some situations the facts
speak for themselves without the aid of expert evidence. ' 41 The second
point of interest in the case was the contention of the defendant that the
39. 327 S.W.2d 913 (Mo. 1959).
40. 327 S.W.2d 918 (Mo. 1959).
41. Id. at 924.
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plaintiff's verdict directing humanitarian instruction was bad because it
said "slackened and swerved it to left or right." The defendant con-
tended this was bad because there was no evidence in the case that the
defendant could have avoided the collision by swerving right. The court
said that since plaintiff had made out a case for failure to slacken speed
alone this did not matter, because this was a "slacken and, swerve" case
and not a "slacken or swerve" case.
Villines v. Vaughn42 arose from an intersection collision on a major
highway. The car in which plaintiff was riding had been driven north off
a gravel road into the path of the defendant's westbound ambulance. The
case was submitted to the jury on humanitarian negligence and a verdict
was returned for the defendant. On appeal the sole question was the
propriety of a portion of the defendant's sole cause instruction which
stated: "and if you further find that immediately thereafter the said Mings
operated said automobile onto the paved portion of said highway and
directly and im'mediately into the path of the approaching ambulance . . .
when there was inmediate danger of a collision . . . ." The principal com-
plaint was that the use of the words immediate or immediately unduly nar-
rowed the zone of peril. The contention was refused by the court principally
for the reason that other portions of the defendant's instruction sufficiently
hypothesized facts bearing on the zone of peril and where it arose. Further
the court said that these words themselves did not, in the circumstances
of the case, tend to improperly narrow the zone of imminent peril.
Carney v. Stuart 4 arose from a collision at the intersection of Highway
40 and Olive Street road in or near St. Louis. The plaintiff who was east
bound on Highway 40 attempted to turn her automobile left onto Olive
Street and in so doing turned her vehicle into the path of the defendant's
westbound passenger car. The collision occurred during daylight hours on a
dry pavement. The plaintiff's case was submitted on humanitarian negligence
in failing to slacken and swerve and judgment pursuant to a jury verdict was
entered for the defendant. On appeal the issues involved the propriety of the
defendant's sole cause instruction. The Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment and remanded the case for error in the giving of that instruction.
The first and most obvious error was similar to that in the Slheerin"
42. Supra note 17.
43. Supra note 18.
44. Sheerin v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 10.
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case. The instruction commenced with a paragraph which embodied for
the most part the statutory duty of a driver making a left turn. This was
held erroneous because it injected plaintiff's antecedent negligence into
the case. Secondly the court said that the defendant's sole cause instruction
was bad because it contained language to the effect that the sole cause of
the collision was the plaintiff's "negligence" in failing to yield the right of
way. The court alluded to the language of Rosenfeld v. Petesr4 and said
that a defendant in a humanitarian case has two theories upon which he
can instruct a jury in a manner which will exonerate him. The first is a
converse humanitarian negligence instruction by which the defendant can
negative one or all of the elements upon which plaintiff's case is based.
(The court noted that an instruction of this sort may be submitted without
supporting evidence.) The other exonerating instruction is the sole cause
instruction. On this facet of the case the court explained that this type of
instruction can be appropriately used in a humanitarian case only if the
defendant hypothesizes (1) a situation where he himself is guilty of no
humanitarian negligence (established by the converse instruction) and (2)
that the collision was due solely to the "acts" of the plaintiff, and that in
so framing a sole cause instruction the defendant should not attempt to
hypothesize that such acts were "negligence," since by doing so he is
injecting a confusing element into the case and in most cases is erroneously
injecting antecedent negligence into the case. The suggestion is made that if
this case is read in conjunction with the case of Rosenfeld v. Peter.06 many
of the pitfalls attended by the use of the sole cause instruction can be
avoided.
This case serves also to bring the cases of Division Two into line with
the heretofore decided cases of Division One wherein mention of plaintiff's
negligence in a sole cause instruction in a humanitarian case has been
condemned.
Lay v. McGrane4 7 arose out of a right angle intersection collision
between the passenger car in which plaintiff was riding and the passenger
car defendant was operating. The collision occurred at a street intersection
without traffic control devices on a clear dry day. The plaintiff submitted his
case against his driver on humanitarian negligence in the disjunctive in
failing to slacken his speed or swerve and against the driver of the other
45. Rosenfeld v. Peters, supra note 12.
46. Id.
47. 331 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1960).
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vehicle on primary negligence in failing to maintain a lookout. The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the host defendant appealed.
In reviewing the plaintiff's verdict directing humanitarian instruction
against his host the Supreme Court said that since the-defendant did not
raise the point that the humanitarian doctrine is inapplicable as between
guest and host, they would assume for the purpose of this appeal; without
deciding that issue, that the plaintiff could submit his case against that
defendant on that theory. Nevertheless the case was reversed and remanded
because in hypothesizing the defendant's various duties in a humanitarian
situation the plaintiff did not tie this duty to a standard of care, e.g., "saw
or could have seen the automobile" should have been "saw or in the exer-
cise of the highest degree of care should have seen."
Another point worth noting in this case was the charitable disposition
of the court in pointing out (after observing the case would have to be
remanded because of the errors mentioned in connection with the instruc-
tion) that plaintiff would probably be better served by submitting his
case against the host on primary negligence or in the event it was resub,
mitted on humanitarian negligence, it should be submitted in the conjunc-
tive in failing to slacken and swerve as opposed to slacken or swerve.
Judge Hyde concurred in the result because he felt that the plaintiff's
evidence made a case of primary negligence against his host but stated
that it was his view that the humanitarian negligence rule was not applica-
ble to a situation where a plaintiff is riding as a guest in a defendant's
automobile.
Findley v. Asher" arose from a right angle intersection collision be-
tween two passenger cars. The defendant's vehicle was traveling south on
a major highway and the plaintiffs' decedent was approaching from de-
fendant's left, going west on a side street marked with a stop sign. The
deceased's vehicle was struck near its front-right by the front-left of defend-
ant's auto. The collision occurred in the daytime on a wet pavement. The
plaintiffs' case was submitted on humanitarian negligence in failing to slacken
and swerve and a jury verdict was returned in their favor.
Upon appeal the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs failed to make a
submissible case for the reason that it was not shown that after the time
the plaintiffs' decedent entered a zone of peril the defendant could have
taken the action suggested to have avoided the collision. The plaintiffs
attempted to place the remote end of the zone of peril back beyond the
48. 334 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1960).
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stop sign at the- edge of the highway on the basis of the plaintiffs' decedent's
speed of 20 miles per hour. The court refused to permit this and said:
"Because of the stop sign, defendant's duty to act under the humanitarian
rule would not commence until; in the exercise of the highest degree of care,
he could have seen deceased approaching so closely to the stop sign at such
a speed that it would not be- possible for her to stop short of his path, un-
less the reasonable appearances before that time were that she intended to
disregard it." 9 The court concluded there was no such evidence in the case.
The plaintiffs also tried to make an "almost escaping" case, but after
careful mathematical computation the court held this was impossible, and
observed that rarely can an "almost escaping" case be made when, as here,
the front of the -deceased's auto is struck.
Montgomery v. Sabel" arose-from a "T" intersection collision between
passenger cars driven by plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff's case was
submitted on humanitarian negligence in failing to slacken speed and stop.
A jury trial resulted in verdict for defendant. On appeal the only issue
was the propriety of the defendant's converse humanitarian instruction.
This instruction, which is set out in full in the report of the case, was held to
be proper and the judgment for defendant was affirmed.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the only reasonable solution to the problems
arising from Missouri's unique humanitarian rule available to the court is
to overrule the application of the last clear chance doctrine in the true
humanitarian case involving mutually discoverable and mutually avoidable
oblivious peril.
A solution by legislation abolishing contributory negligence as a de-
fense, and prescribing a doctrine of proportional fault or comparative neg-
ligence, is always possible but no progress has been made in that field de-
spite several attempts.
If the judicial revocation of the application of the doctrine in cases
of mutually discoverable and avoidable oblivious peril is accompanied by a
policy of permitting the jury to pass on all but obviously clear cases of
contributory negligence, and by an expansion of the use of wilful and wanton
negligence in cases where plaintiff's negligence is a minor antecedent factor,
no really deserving claims will suffer.
49. Id. at 73.
50. 334 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. 1960).
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